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ARTICLE

Interim Measures in Response to the Criminal
Prosecution of Corporations and Their
Employees by Host States in Parallel with
Investment Arbitration Proceedings
HENRY G. BURNETT AND JESSICA BEESS UND CHROSTIN†

INTRODUCTION
Bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) provide important
protections to investors conducting business in foreign countries
(“Host States”). These protections often include the right to have
potential claims against the Host State heard in international
investment arbitration (“investor-state arbitration” or “investment
arbitration”), as opposed to domestic courts. At the same time,
however, the Host State retains its fundamental right to prosecute
individuals and entities, including foreign investors and their
employees, for criminal wrongdoing, where the State sees fit. These
dual spheres of authority may overlap and sometimes, in practice,
form concentric circles that raise difficult questions regarding the
appropriate limits on the prosecutorial power of the State and the
jurisdictional reach of the arbitral tribunal. Where an investor might
see a violation of international law and its right to protection under a
BIT, the Host State may see an investor’s conduct as a violation of its
† Henry G. Burnett is a Partner at King & Spalding LLP. Jessica Beess und
Chrostin is an associate at King & Spalding LLP. The views expressed herein do
not necessarily represent those of King & Spalding LLP or its clients.
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domestic criminal laws.
A variety of issues arise at the intersection of domestic criminal
law and international investment arbitration. In some instances, the
State may use criminal prosecution of an investor or its corporate
employees as retaliation for the investor’s institution of an investorstate arbitration; criminal prosecution—even where justified—may
aggravate the investment dispute. In other cases, the State’s pursuit
of criminal charges may overlap with the arbitral tribunal’s
jurisdiction to determine the merits of the investment dispute and
may require determination of issues that the tribunal has been asked
by the investor to resolve.
Elsewhere, the State’s criminal
prosecution of an investor may form part of the State’s defense in the
investment arbitration itself, i.e., where the State alleges that the
investment was illegally obtained. Yet another possibility is that
criminal prosecutions may constitute an element of the Host State’s
allegedly illegal conduct as, for instance, in the case of a creeping
expropriation.
When faced with criminal prosecution by a Host State where an
investor already has instituted investor-state arbitration, the investor
may, in appropriate circumstances, seek redress in the form of a
request for interim relief from the arbitral tribunal. But how do we
determine the proper boundaries of these potentially overlapping
systems of dispute resolution? What is the proper limit on the State’s
right to prosecute allegedly criminal conduct while an investment
arbitration is pending? What is the proper limit on the arbitral
tribunal’s power to order a State to desist from exercising its inherent
right as sovereign State to conduct criminal investigations and
prosecutions?
This article attempts to distill some answers to these questions
from a review and analysis of recent case law in investor-state
arbitrations. Section I provides an overview of interim measures in
international arbitration generally, focusing on a discussion of the
relevant institutional arbitration rules in investor-state arbitrations.
Section II focuses on recent investment arbitrations in which
investors have sought interim measures to prevent a State from
instituting or continuing criminal prosecutions against the investors.
Section III attempts to distill from this case law some general
principles applicable to requests for interim measures seeking to
enjoin States from exercising their investigative and prosecutorial
powers against foreign investors. As the analysis of the case law
makes clear, tribunals considering requests for interim measures that
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would limit a State’s exercise of its sovereign powers impose a
particularly high threshold on the moving party and require a
showing of urgency and necessity, as well as a direct, tangible impact
on the established rights of the parties to the arbitration.
I.

INTERIM MEASURES
A. Overview

An interim measure (“IM”)1 is a grant of temporary relief
awarded for the protection of a party’s rights pending the final
resolution of a dispute.2 Most frequently, IMs have been granted to
afford four types of relief: (i) to prevent publication to the media or to
the public of matters disclosed in the course of the arbitration; (ii) to
suspend or otherwise impact related litigation proceedings in a
domestic forum; (iii) to preserve evidence that may be relevant to the
conduct and outcome of the arbitration; and (iv) to order security for
costs. Often, especially in the case of IMs aimed at protecting and
conserving relevant evidence, the success of the arbitration process
itself depends on the issuance and enforcement of IMs.3 Destruction
of evidence or alienation of assets may render the final arbitral award
meaningless and lacking in legitimacy. Thus, at their core, IMs are
aimed at protecting the parties’ rights, as well as the integrity of the
arbitral process.
There are at least three distinct categories of rights that arbitral
tribunals generally recognize as subject to protection through IMs: 4
the right to prevent contractual and legal rights that are the subject of
the arbitration from being impaired or eviscerated prior to a final
determination by the tribunal; 5 the right to have the dispute decided
1. Interim measures are also commonly referred to as conservatory or
provisional measures or remedies. For purposes of this article, these terms will be
used interchangeably. IMs are generally available in both international commercial
and investment arbitration. Because this article is concerned with IM applications
and grants to prevent the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings, the
main focus will be on IMs in international investment arbitration.
2. See e.g., Gregoire Marchac, Interim Measures in International Commercial
Arbitration Under the ICC, AAA, LCIA and UNCITRAL Rules, 10 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 123, 123–24 (1999).
3. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 2426 (2d ed. 2001).
4. Caline Mouawad & Elizabeth Silbert, A Guide to Interim Measures in
Investor-State Arbitration, 29 ARB. INT’L, no. 3, 2013, at 381–94.
5. Id. at 394; see, e.g., City Oriente Limited v. The Republic of Ecuador and
Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/21, Decision on Provisional Measures (Nov. 19, 2007); Burlington
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by the international tribunal; 6 and the right to protect a party’s
procedural rights, including the right to preserve the status quo, to
prevent the aggravation or exacerbation of the dispute, and to
preserve the integrity of the arbitral proceedings. 7 As the discussion
infra in Section II will illustrate, this last category is at the forefront
of the discussion regarding IMs where parallel criminal proceedings
are threatened or ongoing.
B. Authority to Grant Interim Measures
As L. Yves Fortier has observed, “[a] tribunal’s jurisdiction to
order provisional measures is, like the parties’ arbitration agreement
itself, a function of the parties’ consent.”8 When parties agree to
resolve a dispute by recourse to arbitration, they are free to determine
the parameters of the dispute resolution process and may adopt
institutional arbitration rules that grant tribunals authority to issue
IMs; alternatively, the parties may agree to restrict the tribunal’s
authority to issue this form of relief. For purposes of the present
discussion of IMs to prevent the institution or continuation of
criminal proceedings, two sets of institutional arbitration rules are
relevant: the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Resources Inc. and others v. Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos
del Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Procedural Order No. 1 on
Burlington Oriente’s Request for Provisional Measures (June 29, 2009); Perenco
Ecuador Ltd. v. The Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del
Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Provisional
Measures (May 8, 2009); Tethyan Copper Company Pty Limited v. The Islamic
Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/1, Decision on Claimant’s Request
for Provisional Measures (Dec. 13, 2012).
6. Mouawad & Silbert, supra note 4, at 394; see also Electricity Company of
Sofia and Bulgaria (Belgium v. Bulgaria), Interim Measures of Protection, 1939
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 79 (Dec. 5, 1939); Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v.
Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Procedural Order No. 4 (Jan. 11,
1999) 5 ICSID Rep. 4 (2002).
7. See Mouawad & Silbert, supra note 4, at 394 (noting that that at least one
case has held that “the general rights to attract foreign investment, regulate and
promote foreign investment, enforce regulations, and protect its [the State’s]
reputation are not ‘rights in dispute that could warrant the recommendation or
provisional measures.”) (citing Churchill Mining PLC v. Republic of Indonesia,
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14, Procedural Order No. 3, Provisional Measures, ¶ 50
(Mar., 4 2013)); see also Electricity Company; LaGrand Case (Germany v. United
States of America), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1999 I.C.J.
(Mar. 3, 1999); Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Order No.
1 Claimant’s Request for Provisional Measures (July, 1 2003); City Oriente, supra
note 5.
8. L. Yves Fortier, Interim Measures: An Arbitrator’s Provisional Views,
Fordham Law School Conference on International Arbitration and Mediation, 3
(June 16, 2008), available at http://www.arbitration icca.org/media/0/12232952989
920/1115_001.pdf.
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Disputes’ Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States (the “ICSID
Convention”); and the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law Arbitration Rules of 1976 (the “1976 UNCITRAL
Rules”) and as revised in 2010 (the “2010 UNCITRAL Rules”).9
1. The ICSID Convention
The ICSID Convention addresses IMs in Article 47, which
provides as follows.
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal
may, if it considers that the circumstances so require,
recommend any provisional measures which should be
taken to preserve the respective rights of either party. 10
This provision expressly acknowledges the parties’ right to
restrict the arbitral tribunal’s authority to award interim relief, but
otherwise affords the arbitrators broad discretion, circumscribed only
by the requirement that the tribunal consider that “the circumstances
so require” interim relief. Rule 39 of the 2006 ICSID Rules of
Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (the “ICSID Arbitration
Rules”) provides some further guidance and states that:
(1) At any time after the institution of the proceeding,
a party may request that provisional measures for
the preservation of its rights be recommended by
the Tribunal. The request shall specify the rights to
be preserved, the measures the recommendation of
which is requested, and the circumstances that
require such measures.
(2) The Tribunal shall give priority to the
consideration of a request made pursuant to
paragraph (1).
(3) The Tribunal may also recommend provisional
9. IMs are available in both commercial and investor-state arbitration.
Accordingly, most, if not all, institutional arbitration rules have provisions
regarding IMs. See, e.g., INT’L CHAMBER OF COMM. R. OF ARB. art. 28
(“Conservatory and Interim Measures”); ARB. R. OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF
COMM. art 32 (“Interim Measures”); INT’L CTR. FOR DISP. RES. P. art 24 (“Interim
Measures”). As this article is not concerned with IMs in international commercial
arbitration, a discussion of these rules is outside its scope.
10. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States art 47, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S.
159, 17 U.S.T. 1270.
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measures on its own initiative or recommend
measures other than those specified in a request. It
may at any time modify or revoke its
recommendations.
(4) The Tribunal shall only recommend provisional
measures,
or
modify
or
revoke
its
recommendations, after giving each party an
opportunity of presenting its observations.
(5) If a party makes a request pursuant to paragraph
(1) before constitution of the Tribunal, the
Secretary-General shall, on the application of
either party, fix time limits for the parties to
present observations on the request, so that the
request and observations may be considered by the
Tribunal promptly upon its constitution.
(6) Nothing in this Rule shall prevent the parties,
provided that they have so stipulated in the
agreement recording their consent, from requesting
any judicial or other authority to order provisional
measures, prior to or after the institution of the
proceeding, for the preservation of their respective
rights and interests. 11
Under Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, a party may
request IMs at any time after instituting the arbitration proceeding,
even before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. The request for
IMs must include three elements: (i) a statement of the rights the
party seeks to preserve by requesting the IMs; (ii) a statement of the
measures it requests; and (iii) a discussion of the circumstances
justifying and/or necessitating the grant of IMs.
If a party requests IMs before the tribunal is properly
constituted, the Secretary-General of ICSID may, upon the parties’
request, set a schedule for briefing the IM request and opposition, so
that the tribunal may turn to this issue immediately upon its
constitution. Further, Rule 39(3) clarifies that the tribunal is free to
recommend IMs on its own initiative and to subsequently modify or
revoke any IM it recommends. 12
Importantly, the use of the word “recommend,” as opposed to
11. Id. at r. 39.
12. Id.
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“order,” does not render the tribunal’s determination with regard to
IMs under the ICSID Convention and Rules any less binding than
IMs ordered under other institutional arbitration rules like the
UNCITRAL Rules, discussed below. Redfern and Hunter explain
that: “[t]he use of the word ‘recommend’ in this context stems from
the concern of the drafters of the ICSID Convention to be seen as
respectful of national sovereignty by not granting powers to private
tribunals to order a state to do or not do something on a purely
provisional basis.”13 Initially, as Schreuer confirms, “a conscious
decision was made not to grant the tribunal the power to order
binding provisional measures.”14 However, as investor-state tribunals
continued to apply the ICSID Convention and Rules in adjudicating
requests for IMs, tribunal determinations on IMs have emerged as
binding. As the tribunal in Maffezini stated, “[t]he Tribunal’s
authority to rule on provisional measures is not less binding than that
of a final award. Accordingly, for the purposes of this order, the
tribunal deems the word ‘recommend’ to be of equivalent value as
the word ‘order.’”15
2. The 1976 and 2010 UNCITRAL Rules
Under the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, the power of the arbitral
tribunal to award interim relief is set forth in Articles 15(1), 26(1),
and 26(2), which provide:
Article 15(1): Subject to these Rules, the arbitral
tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as
it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are
treated with equality and that at any stage of the
proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of
presenting his case.
Article 26(1): At the request of either party, the
arbitral tribunal may take any interim measures it
13. REDFERN AND HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 333 (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. 2004).
14. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 758
(Cambridge University Press, 2001).
15. Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/7, Procedural Order No. 2, ¶ 9 (Oct. 28, 1999) 5 ICSID Rep. 11 (2002);
see also Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Order No. 1
Claimant’s Request for Provisional Measures, ¶ 4 (July 1, 2003) (“It is to be
recalled that, according to a well-established principle laid down by the
jurisprudence of the ICSID tribunals, provisional measures ‘recommended’ by an
ICSID tribunal are legally compulsory; they are in effect ‘ordered’ by the tribunal
and the parties are under a legal obligation to comply with them.”).
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deems necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the
dispute, including measures for the conservation of the
goods forming the subject-matter in dispute, such as
ordering their deposit with a third person or the sale of
perishable goods.
Article 26(2): Such interim measures may be
established in the form of an interim award. The
arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to require security for
the cost of such measures.16
The 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, like the ICSID Convention and
Rules, afford the arbitral tribunal broad discretion with regard to
awarding IMs. However, the UNCITRAL Rules differ in many
significant respects from the relevant provisions under the ICSID
regime. Notably, it is unclear from the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules
whether the arbitral tribunal has discretion to recommend IMs on its
own initiative. On the one hand, Article 15(1) states that the tribunal
is free to conduct the proceedings as it sees fit, subject only to the
requirement to treat all parties equally and to give the parties a full
opportunity to present their respective cases. On the other hand,
Article 26 expressly grants the parties the right to request IMs, but
omits to grant such a right to the tribunal. Under customary
international law rules of interpretation, ordinarily, expressio unius
est exclusio alterius,17 suggesting that a tribunal constituted under the
1976 UNCITRAL Rules may not have authority to recommend IMs
at its own initiative. Further, the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules do not
address the tribunal’s power to amend an IM order after its initial
issuance, nor do the rules address the timing of requests for IMs.
This lack of clarity in the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules meant that
“little legal consensus existed as to the proper scope and
implementation of interim measures in international arbitration[s]”
conducted under these rules.18 IMs thus became one of the issues
most heavily modified when the UNCITRAL Rules were revisited
and revised in 2010. As one commentator notes, “[i]n particular, the
new Arbitration Rules unify and clarify the function of interim
measures in international arbitration and are intended for universal
16. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, UN DOC. A/RES/31/28
(Dec. 15, 1976).
17. “The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1913 (10th ed. 2014).
18. Lee Anna Tucker, Note, Interim Measures under Revised UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules: Comparison to Model Law Reflects both Greater Flexibility and
Remaining Uncertainty, 1 INT’L COMM. ARB. BRIEF, no. 2, 2011, at 16.
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application.”19 Since the UNCITRAL Rules may be used in both
commercial and investor-state arbitrations, the focus of the 2010
UNCITRAL Rules’ provision on IMs is both to make the rules
applicable to all types of arbitration regardless of the subject matter
of the dispute and to provide increased guidance on the
circumstances, conditions, and procedures for granting IMs. 20
Unlike the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, the 2010 revision provides
extensive detail on the definition of interim measures under the
UNCITRAL Rules, the purposes for which IMs may be granted, the
test for granting a request for IMs, and the scope of the tribunal’s
power to amend, suspend, or terminate a granted IM. 21 Notably, the
19. Id.
20. UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on
the Work of its Forty-Fifth Session, ¶¶ 17–18, delivered to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/614 (Oct. 5, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Working Group Report].
21. Article 26 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules provides as follows:
1. The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, grant interim
measures.
2. An interim measure is any temporary measure by which, at any time
prior to the issuance of the award by which the dispute is finally
decided, the arbitral tribunal orders a party, for example and without
limitation, to:
(a) Maintain or restore the status quo pending determination of the
dispute;
(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that
is likely to cause, (i) current or imminent harm or (ii) prejudice to
the arbitral process itself;
(c) Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent
award may be satisfied; or
(d) Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the
resolution of the dispute.
3. The party requesting an interim measure under paragraphs 2(a) to (c)
shall satisfy the arbitral tribunal that:
(a) Harm not adequately reparable by an award of damages is likely
to result if the measure is not ordered, and such harm substantially
outweighs the harm that is likely to result to the party against whom
the measure is directed if the measure is granted; and
(b) There is a reasonable possibility that the requesting party will
succeed on the merits of the claim. The determination on this
possibility shall not affect the discretion of the arbitral tribunal in
making any subsequent determination.
4. With regard to a request for an interim measure under paragraph
2(d), the requirements in paragraphs 3(a) and (b) shall apply only to the
extent the arbitral tribunal considers appropriate.
5. The arbitral tribunal may modify, suspend or terminate an interim
measure it has granted, upon application of any party or, in exceptional
circumstances and upon prior notice to the parties on the arbitral
tribunal’s own initiative.
6. The arbitral tribunal may require the party requesting an interim
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2010 UNCITRAL Rules Working Group deleted the words “in
respect of the subject-matter of the dispute” from the Arbitration
Rules as being “overly restrictive” as to what circumstances may
justify interim measures.22 Thus, while the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules
are in many ways more detailed and specific than the earlier 1976
version, they are also broader in some respects. Since no requests for
IMs to prohibit the institution or continuation of criminal proceedings
against an investor and/or its corporate executives have been decided
under the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules to date, it remains to be seen how,
if at all, the revised rules will change the availability of IMs in these
situations.
II.

RECENT CASES INVOLVING INTERIM MEASURES TO PROHIBIT THE
INSTITUTION OR CONTINUATION OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

Tribunals in at least seven ICSID and two UNCITRAL cases
have addressed requests for protection in the face of a Host State’s
pursuit of criminal charges.
A. Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine
The arbitral tribunal in Tokios Tokelés was the first tribunal to
hold that it had authority to grant a provisional measures request to
enjoin a Host State from continuing criminal prosecution of an
investor’s corporate executives. 23 In this case, the claimant was an
investor company that carried on a “business in Ukraine in the
advertising, printing, publishing and allied trades, under the control
and management of two brothers, Mr. Oleksandr V. Danylov and Mr.
measure to provide appropriate security in connection with the
measure.
7. The arbitral tribunal may require any party promptly to disclose any
material change in the circumstances on the basis of which the interim
measure was requested or granted.
8. The party requesting an interim measure may be liable for any costs
and damages caused by the measure to any party if the arbitral tribunal
later determines that, in the circumstances then prevailing, the measure
should not have been granted. The arbitral tribunal may award such
costs and damages at any point during the proceedings.
9. A request for interim measures address by any party to a judicial
authority shall not be deemed incompatible with the agreement to
arbitrate, or as a waiver of that agreement.
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 65/22, UN Doc. A/RES/65/22 (Dec.
6, 2010).
22. 2006 Working Group Report, supra note 17, at ¶ 105.
23. See Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Order No. 1,
Claimant’s Request for Provisional Measures, ¶ 1 (July 1, 2003).
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Serhiy V. Danylov.”24 Among other things, the claimant alleged that
its company was the subject of a targeted and long-running campaign
of oppression by State agencies, ultimately culminating in a wrongful
expropriation of the claimant’s investment. During the pendency of
the investment arbitration, the claimant filed a request for provisional
measures, requesting the tribunal to order the respondent to “refrain
from, suspend, and discontinue: (i) the criminal proceedings against
O.V. Danylov, General Director of Claimant’s subsidiaries in
Ukraine; (ii) the arrest of assets of Claimant’s subsidiaries in
Ukraine; and (iii) tax investigations of Claimant’s subsidiaries in
Ukraine.”25 Only the first request is relevant to the present
discussion.
In its Order No. 3, the tribunal discussed Article 47 of the ICSID
Convention and Arbitration Rule 39, as well as prior investor-state
arbitrations addressing requests for interim relief. 26 The tribunal
concluded that: “[t]he circumstances under which provisional
measures are required under Article 47 are those in which the
measures are necessary to preserve a party’s rights and that need is
urgent.”27 IMs are necessary “where the actions of a party are
capable of causing or of threatening irreparable prejudice to the rights
invoked,”28 and they are urgent where “action prejudicial to the rights
of either party is likely to be taken before such final decision is
taken.”29 The tribunal proceeded to note that the respondent was
incorrect in arguing that criminal proceedings against an employee of
the investor cannot be the subject of a provisional measure because
such proceedings are not part of a legal dispute arising directly out of
the claimant’s investment. The tribunal stated that:
It is not necessary for a tribunal to establish that the
actions complained of in a request for provisional
measures meet the jurisdictional requirements of
Article 25 [of the ICSID Convention]. A tribunal may
order a provisional measure if the actions of the
24. Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Award, ¶ 2 (July
26, 2007).
25. Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Order No. 3, ¶ 2
(Jan. 18, 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Id. ¶ 6 et seq.
27. Id. ¶ 8 (citing CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A
COMMENTARY 751–57 (Cambridge U. Press 2001)).
28. Id. ¶ 8 (citing Separate Opinion of President Jiménez de Aréchaga, Aegean
Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3, 16.).
29. Id. ¶ 8 (citing Order of 29 Jul. 1991, Case Concerning Passage Through the
Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1991 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 23).
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opposing party “relate to the subject matter of the case
before the tribunal and not to separate, unrelated
issues or extraneous matters.”30
Having established that criminal proceedings may properly be
the subject of IMs, however, the tribunal ultimately concluded that
the request for IMs should not be granted in this instance to enjoin
the criminal proceedings against O.V. Danylov. 31 The tribunal
reasoned that the claimant had failed to show that a provisional
measure was either necessary or urgent to protect its rights.
Importantly, the tribunal looked to the timing of the institution of the
criminal proceedings and noted that they were initiated nine months
before the claimant registered its ICSID claim, yet the claimant did
not include the criminal proceedings in its prior request for
provisional measures. Consequently, the claimant could not now
credibly claim that IMs were urgent.
B. City Oriente v. Ecuador
In City Oriente, the claimant initiated ICSID arbitration
proceedings against Ecuador following amendments to the
Hydrocarbon Law purporting to unilaterally modify the parties’
hydrocarbon production-sharing contract.32 City Oriente refused to
comply with the amended law, and in response, the State Attorney
General of Ecuador announced that a criminal complaint against City
Oriente’s representatives and managers would be filed on the basis of
the investor’s non-compliance with the new Hydrocarbon Law. City
Oriente requested interim measures to maintain the status quo ante
after the State Attorney General of Ecuador made this announcement.
And in fact, during the pendency of the IM request, two criminal
complaints were filed against the claimant’s executives. In its
Decision on Provisional Measures, the tribunal stated that a tribunal
determining applications for IMs may and should take into
consideration whether the adoption of the IMs is necessary to
preserve the petitioner’s rights, whether their ordering is urgent, and
whether each party has been afforded an opportunity to raise
observations.33
30. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Emilio Augustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID
Case No. ARB/97/7, Procedural Order No. 2, ¶ 23 (Oct. 28, 1999)).
31. Id. at ¶¶ 12–13.
32. City Oriente Limited v. The Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal
Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID Case No. ARB/06/21, Decision on
Provisional Measures, ¶¶ 1–5 (Nov. 19, 2007).
33. Id. ¶ 54.
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The tribunal looked at each of these factors in turn and granted
City Oriente’s IM request, finding that City Oriente met all three
considerations.34 More specifically, the tribunal found that the main
purpose of provisional measures in ICSID arbitrations is to preserve
the status quo ante, and that this was precisely what the claimant
sought to do:
In other words, it is the Tribunal’s view that Article 47
of the Convention provides authorization for the
passing of provisional measures prohibiting any action
that affects the disputed rights, aggravates the dispute,
frustrates the effectiveness of the award or entails
having either party take justice into their own hands.
Where there is an agreement in place between the
parties that has so far defined the framework of their
mutual obligations, then the rights to be preserved are,
precisely, those that were thereby agreed upon. 35
Although the tribunal noted that it had great respect for the
Ecuadorian judiciary and acknowledged that Ecuador’s sovereign
authority included the right to prosecute and punish crimes
perpetrated in its territory, the tribunal found that Ecuador was using
the prosecution “as a means to coactively secure payment of the
amounts allegedly owed by City Oriente pursuant to [the new
Hydrocarbons Law].”36 Since the legality of the new law and its
application to City Oriente were precisely the subject of the
arbitration, the tribunal found that Ecuador’s prosecutions would
violate the principle that neither party may aggravate or extend a
dispute or take justice into its own hands. The tribunal therefore
ordered the parties to abide by the contract as it was originally
executed and ordered Ecuador to suspend the criminal proceedings
against City Oriente’s executives.
C. Caratube v. Kazakhstan
In Caratube, the claimant initiated ICSID arbitration
proceedings against Kazakhstan after that State unilaterally
terminated a contract for the exploration and production of
hydrocarbons. 37 Despite the termination, Caratube continued to
34. Id. ¶ 83.
35. Id. ¶ 55.
36. Id. ¶ 62.
37. Caratube International Oil Company LLP v. The Republic of Kazakhstan,
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/12, Decision Regarding Claimant’s Application for
Provisional Measures, ¶ 4 (July 31, 2009).
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operate certain oil wells to avoid adverse technical consequences,
and, in response, Kazakhstan initiated criminal proceedings against
Caratube and its directors for the unlawful continued operation of the
wells.
The claimant requested interim measures ordering
Kazakhstani authorities to refrain from acting upon any existing
criminal complaints or to file any new criminal complaints against
the claimant.
In its Decision Regarding Claimant’s Application for
Provisional Measures, the tribunal cited Tokios Tokelés with approval
and pointed to the language of ICSID Article 47 and Rule 39, stating
that the rule does not indicate that any specific state action must be
excluded from the scope of possible provisional measures. 38 Rather,
“this broad language can be interpreted to the effect that, in principle,
criminal investigations may not be totally excluded from the scope of
provisional measures in ICSID proceedings.”39
However, in
recognition of the state’s sovereign right to prosecute crime, “a
particularly high threshold must be overcome before an ICSID
tribunal can indeed recommend provisional measures regarding
criminal investigations conducted by a state.”40 The tribunal held that
the claimant did not meet this particularly high threshold. The
claimant failed to show, according to the tribunal, that its procedural
right to continue with the ICSID arbitration would be precluded by
the criminal investigation, and further, since the claimant sought
monetary damages rather than injunctive relief, any additional harm
to the claimant could be examined and determined at a later stage in
the proceedings.41 For these reasons there was neither necessity nor
urgency supporting the claimant’s IM application.
D. Quiborax v. Bolivia
In Quiborax v. Bolivia, Quiborax, alongside Non Metallic
Minerals (NMM) and Allan Fosk Kaplún, instituted ICSID
arbitration proceedings against Bolivia, seeking compensation for
damages following the Host State’s revocation of eleven mining
concessions.42 Bolivia initiated criminal proceedings against the coclaimants and other related individuals on the ground that they had
38. Id. ¶ 54 et seq.
39. Id. ¶ 136.
40. Id. ¶ 137.
41. Id. ¶¶ 139–40.
42. Quiborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v.
Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Provisional
Measures, ¶ 4 (Feb. 26, 2010).
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allegedly forged a document establishing that Quiborax and Mr. Fosk
were NMM shareholders and thus protected investors under the
Bolivia-Chile BIT.
Although the subject matter of the criminal proceedings was the
prosecution of the investors’ alleged crimes of forgery and fraud, the
tribunal found that the criminal proceedings could properly be the
subject of IMs since the crimes at issue were directly related to the
arbitration. The subject matter of the criminal proceedings could be
outcome determinative for the investors’ access to the arbitration,
and, in fact, “this access to ICSID arbitration is expressly deemed to
constitute the harm caused to Bolivia that is required as one of the
constituent elements of the crimes prosecuted.”43
After establishing its authority to grant IMs on the subject matter
of the request, the tribunal proceeded to address the requirements for
a successful IM application. In its Decision on Provisional Measures,
the tribunal found that the ICSID Convention and Rules required the
satisfaction of a three-pronged test before a tribunal could grant
provisional measures: (i) the rights to be protected through the IM
must exist and the IM must be both (ii) urgent and (iii) necessary.44
The tribunal found all three requirements satisfied and granted the
request for IMs.
Importantly, the tribunal expressly declared that it had full
respect for Bolivia’s sovereign right to prosecute crimes committed
in its territory, but also found that the criminal prosecutions appeared
to target the claimants in the arbitration because they had initiated the
arbitration. 45 The tribunal reasoned that Bolivia’s institution of the
43. Id. ¶ 120.
44. Id. ¶ 113.
45. Id. ¶ 121. ¶ 121 provides as follows:
In addition, although the Tribunal has every respect for Bolivia’s
sovereign right to prosecute crimes committed within its territory, the
evidence in the record suggests that the criminal proceedings were
initiated as a result of a corporate audit that targeted Claimants because
they had initiated this arbitration. Indeed, the Querella Criminal
expressly states that the alleged irregularities in Claimants’ corporate
documentation were deterred in consideration of (“en atención a”) the
Request for Arbitration filed by Claimants against Bolivia. Lorena
Fernández, one of the authors of Informe 001/2005, testified that the
corporate audit was made at the request of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in the context of an arbitration proceeding and was aimed at
establishing whether the shareholders in NMM were Chilean nationals.
Indeed, the very content of Informe 001/2005 suggests that the
underlying motivation for the audit was to serve Bolivia in the defense
of this arbitration claim, as it contained specific recommendations for
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criminal proceedings in essence amounted to a “defense strategy”46
and concluded that the State must execute its prosecutorial powers
“in good faith and respecting Claimants’ rights, including their prima
facie right to pursue this arbitration.”47 Because the tribunal found
that the criminal proceedings were directly related to the arbitration
and that Bolivia’s investigation formed part of its defense to the
arbitration claim, the tribunal ordered Bolivia to take appropriate
measures to suspend the criminal proceedings, finding that they
threatened the procedural integrity of the arbitration—in particular,
the claimants’ right of access to evidence through witnesses. 48
However, the tribunal rejected the claimants’ contention that the
criminal proceedings threatened the exclusivity of the arbitration,
aggravated the dispute, or had modified the status quo ante.
E. Von Pezold, et al. v. Zimbabwe
In Von Pezold, the claimants held investments in three large
estates that produced timber, tobacco, tea, coffee, and macadamia
nuts in Zimbabwe. 49 The claimants instituted two ICSID arbitrations
seeking restitution and damages for the alleged expropriation of those
estates.
On June 11, 2012, the claimants received a letter from
Zimbabwe’s Attorney General requesting that the claimants disclose
certain documents in connection with the arbitrations and threatening
to institute criminal proceedings if they refused. 50 The next day, on
June 12, 2012, the claimants filed a request for provisional measures
with the ICSID tribunal. One day later, the president of the tribunal,
L. Yves Fortier, ruled on claimants’ application, directing Zimbabwe
to refrain from taking any action in connection with its letter to the
claimants of June 11, 2012.
Exceptionally, the decision provided no reasons supporting the
tribunal’s grant of interim measures. The President of the tribunal
such defense.
See also id. ¶ 119 (“It is evident from the record that the criminal proceedings
are related to, and may even be motivated by, the ICSID arbitration.”).
46. Id. ¶ 122.
47. Id. ¶ 123.
48. Id. ¶ 148.
49. German Farmers Take Case to ICSID, THE ZIMBABWEAN (July 20, 2010,
8:07 AM), http://www.thezimbabwean.co/politics/33109/german-farmers-takecase-to-icsid.html.
50. Bernhard von Pezold and Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/15, Directions Concerning Claimants’ Application for Provisional
Measures of 12 June 2012, ¶ 3 (June 13, 2012).

04 - BURNETT BEESUNDCHROSTIN (DO NOT DELETE)

5/6/2015 10:32 AM

2015] RESPONDING TO THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF CORPORATIONS 47

merely alluded to the “potential consequences that might result from
[Zimbabwe’s] proposed actions.”51 The lack of reasoning may be
explained by the apparent urgency of the threat and the short time
between the request for interim measures and the issuance of the
order granting the request.
F. Lao Holdings v. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic
In Lao Holdings, the claimant owned investments in various
gambling establishments in Laos and brought an ICSID Additional
Facility arbitration to seek damages for alleged expropriation of their
investments through confiscatory taxation and other government
measures. 52 At the time of institution of the ICSID arbitration, there
were ongoing court proceedings seeking to hold the claimant
accountable for $20 million in back taxes as well as an investigation
into money laundering allegations against the claimant. 53 The
investor sought provisional measures to prevent the government from
continuing these proceedings.
In an unpublished decision, the tribunal granted the investor’s
provisional measures request, prohibiting the respondent State from
“taking any steps that would alter the status quo ante or aggravate the
dispute.”54 Notably, the respondent apparently consented to stay the
proceedings as part of its “conciliatory efforts to allow the arbitration
process to proceed in an environment conducive to timely action by
the Tribunal.”55
Subsequently, on the eve of the hearing on the merits, the
respondent requested a modification of the tribunal’s Decision on
Provisional Measures of September 17, 2013 to allow the respondent
State to interview and depose potential witnesses and seek assistance
from the government and courts of the U.S. and other countries to
investigate the claimants’ alleged criminal activity. 56 The tribunal
dismissed the respondent’s request, citing in support of its decision
the respondent’s initial agreement to the terms of the Decision on
Provisional Measures and noting that:

51. Id. ¶ 7.
52. Lao Holdings N.V. v. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/12/6, Ruling on Motion to Amend the Provisional Measures Order, ¶
2 (May 30, 2014).
53. Id. ¶¶ 4(i), 48.
54. Id. ¶ 1.
55. Id. ¶ 4(i).
56. Id. ¶ 1.
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[C]riminal proceedings launched in the midst of final
preparations for the arbitration, and running
concurrently with the hearing would considerably
broaden and aggravate the dispute between the parties,
in threatening the integrity of the arbitral process; and
the Respondent has not established a change of
circumstances sufficient to justify its proposed
modification of the PMO or the necessity and urgency
for so doing on the eve of the merits hearing. 57
This case is different from those discussed heretofore, since the
respondent State originally agreed to discontinue the criminal
proceedings, but later requested an amendment of the tribunal’s order
to allow the State to re-launch the criminal investigation on the eve of
the hearing on the merits. Under these circumstances, the tribunal
found that the respondent had to show urgency and necessity in order
to obtain an amendment to the original IM order.58 Since the
respondent failed to meet this burden, the tribunal denied the
respondent’s request.
G. Churchill Mining and Planet Mining v. Indonesia
In Churchill Mining, the claimants commenced an ICSID
arbitration against Indonesia to dispute the revocation of four mining
licenses. 59 According to the claimants, they obtained these licenses
through their partnership with a local group of companies called the
Ridlamata Group. On February 24, 2014, only days after the tribunal
issued its decision upholding jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regent
of East Kutai announced his intention to initiate criminal proceedings
“against the Claimants and their witnesses.”60 On March 21, 2014,
the Regent filed criminal charges against the Ridlamata Group on the
ground of forgery of official documents. 61
Churchill Mining promptly filed an application for IMs on
March 27, 2014, requesting among other things that Indonesia refrain
from threatening or commencing any criminal investigation or
57. Id. ¶ 4(iii).
58. Id. ¶ 9.
59. Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of Indonesia,
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 12/40, Procedural Order No. 3, Provisional
Measures, ¶ 4 (Mar. 4, 2013).
60. Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of Indonesia,
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 12/40, Procedural Order No. 9, Provisional
Measures, ¶ 5 (July 8, 2014).
61. Id. ¶ 84.
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prosecution against the claimants, their witnesses or any person
associated with the claimants’ operations in Indonesia, and that
Indonesia suspend or stay any pending criminal investigation against
the claimants’ and their associates.62
In deciding the claimants’ application, the tribunal stated in its
Procedural Order No. 9 that:
Various ICSID tribunals have interpreted these
requirements [of ICSID Rule 39] to mean that
provisional measures must (i) serve to protect certain
rights of the applicant, (ii) meet the requirement of
urgency; and (iii) the requirement of necessity, which
implies the existence of a risk of irreparable or
substantial harm. 63
The tribunal refused the request for provisional measures
because, inter alia, the Ridlamata Group was not a party to the
arbitration; no investigations or prosecutions against the claimants or
their current witnesses had been commenced; and the urgency and
necessity requirements were not met since the claimants’ rights were
not affected by the proceedings against the Ridlamata Group, even
though the claimants had business dealings with the Ridlamata
Group. This case follows the line of precedent adopting a high
threshold for imposing IM orders on States to prohibit the institution
or continuation of criminal proceedings. Here, because the threat was
exactly that—merely a threat—, the tribunal found that the
requirements for IMs had not been satisfied.
H. Paushok v. Mongolia
In Paushok, an investment arbitration under the 1976
UNCITRAL Rules, the claimants alleged that the respondent State
breached its international law obligations by passing laws that
adversely impacted the ability of mining companies to do business in
Mongolia. 64 Specifically, the claimants objected to the enforcement
of a disputed windfall profit tax law. While the dispute was pending,
62. Id. ¶ 1.
63. Id. ¶ 69.
64. Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz
Company v. The Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Order on Interim
Measures, ¶¶ 1–6 (Sept. 2, 2008). Paushok v. Mongolia is the first of two
UNCITRAL cases discussed in this article. Both of these cases apply the 1976
UNCITRAL Rules; as noted previously, there is no case to date under the 2010
UNCITRAL Rules in which an investor has sought IMs to prevent a State from
exercising its right to institute or continue criminal proceedings.
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the claimants filed a request for interim measures asking, among
other things, that Mongolia be directed to suspend any criminal
action against the claimants or their investments. 65
In its Order on Interim Measures, the tribunal held that it had
authority to issue IMs only if a five-factor test was satisfied: (1)
prima facie jurisdiction; (2) prima facie establishment of the case; (3)
urgency; (4) imminent danger of serious prejudice (necessity); and
(5) proportionality. 66 Carefully noting that, in spite of the first two
factors, the tribunal was not prejudging the jurisdiction and merits of
the case, it held that the claimants’ request met these five
requirements and granted the requested interim relief in full. 67
Notably, however, the tribunal did not specifically direct Mongolia to
suspend the criminal prosecutions against the claimants, but rather
directed both parties to refrain from actions that could further
aggravate the dispute, which presumably included Mongolia’s pursuit
of criminal actions against the claimants.
I. Chevron v. Ecuador
The claimants in Chevron instituted an UNCITRAL proceeding
upon the issuance of a domestic Ecuadorian court judgment holding
Chevron liable for over US$18 billion in environmental damages.68
In this ongoing arbitration, the claimants argue, among other things,
that the Ecuadorian judgment constitutes a denial of justice and that
Ecuador has violated a host of protections to which the claimants are
entitled under the Ecuador-United States BIT.69
Starting before the commencement of the arbitration and
continuing on and off throughout the proceeding, the respondent
State pursued criminal investigation and charges against some of the
claimants’ attorneys, and certain witnesses now supporting the
claimants, on the grounds of their involvement in the environmental
remediation that forms part of the basis of the environmental
judgment in Ecuador.70 On multiple occasions and on many bases,
65. Id. ¶ 12.
66. Id. ¶ 45.
67. Id. ¶ 91 et seq.
68. Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic
of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Claimants’ Supplemental
Memorial on the Merits, ¶ 1 (Mar. 20, 2012).
69. See id. ¶ 3 (“The evidence in this case proves that Ecuador has committed a
denial of justice and various violations of Claimants’ rights under the BIT.”).
70. Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic
of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Third Interim Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, pt. I, at 9 (Feb. 27, 2012).
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the claimants have sought IMs, including requesting an order that
Ecuador refrain from continuing the criminal proceedings against the
claimants’ counsel in Ecuador. This dispute is ongoing and the
tribunal has issued no fewer than seven Interim Measures Orders and
Awards directing both parties to maintain the status quo ante.71
III. DISTILLED PRINCIPLES
As the discussion above shows, the case law on IMs to enjoin a
State from instituting or continuing criminal investigations or
prosecutions against investors is far from uniform, but nevertheless, a
few general principles can be distilled that may provide some useful
guidance to parties facing parallel criminal prosecutions.
First, although some tribunals add other factors, all tribunals
have required a showing that IMs will serve to protect certain
identified, existing rights, and that such measures are both necessary
and urgent. While this seems to be the core threshold test for
granting IMs to enjoin criminal proceedings, tribunals retain
discretion to consider a host of other factors, including, for example,
prima facie establishment of the case.72
Second, most tribunals expressly recognize the right of the State
to conduct criminal investigations and institute criminal proceedings.
As such, tribunals remain highly deferential to the State’s rights and
are reluctant to award IMs that might impinge on the State’s
prerogatives. In recognition of these dynamics, arbitral tribunals
have stated that they impose a particularly high threshold on requests
for IMs. Nevertheless, in the nine cases discussed above, four
tribunals granted requests for IMs to enjoin the institution or
continuation of criminal proceedings73 and in one additional case, the
tribunal denied in part and granted in part the request for IMs.74 In
only three of the nine cases did the tribunals deny a request for IMs to
enjoin criminal proceedings. 75

71. See Mouawad & Silbert, supra note 4, at 389–92 (discussing each of these
orders).
72. See supra Part II.H.
73. See supra Part II.B, E, H, and I.
74. See supra Part II.D.
75. See supra Part II.A, C, and G. Technically, the tribunal in Lao Holdings
also denied the applicant’s request regarding IMs, but since in that case, the
respondent initially agreed to the IMs and later requested a modification thereof,
which was denied, it does not properly belong in the category of cases denying
requests for IMs to enjoin criminal proceedings.
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Third, tribunals ordinarily will not grant requests for IMs where
criminal proceedings are at issue unless a cognizable right of a party
to the arbitration is directly affected.76 The impact of the criminal
proceedings must be felt by the party to the arbitration, not merely its
affiliated entities.
Fourth, a mere threat of criminal prosecution or investigation
without more usually will not be sufficient to warrant granting IMs to
enjoin potential future criminal proceedings. 77
Fifth, IMs to enjoin the commencement or continuation of
criminal proceedings are more likely to be granted where they are
connected with evidentiary issues that may impact the tribunal’s own
deliberations. 78 In Von Pezold and Quiborax, for instance, the
criminal proceedings directly impacted the investor’s ability to
gather, maintain, or gain access to evidence relevant to the
international arbitration, thereby threatening the integrity of the
arbitral process itself and the legitimacy of the ultimate arbitral
award.
Finally, it appears that a State requesting a reversal or
modification to an existing provisional measures award enjoining
criminal proceedings will need to carry the same burden as a party
seeking to obtain the protection to begin with. 79 Once the tribunal has
found that the heightened threshold for awarding IMs in the criminal
proceedings context is met, there is an apparently equally high
threshold to show that the risk previously justifying the IMs no
longer persists. There is, however, only one case for this proposition
and it remains to be seen whether more requests of this kind emerge.
CONCLUSION
As is clear from the discussion above, the intersection between a
sovereign’s right to enforce its criminal laws and international
investment arbitration is rife with possibilities for conflict.
Admittedly, IMs to enjoin the institution or continuation of criminal
proceedings pose a conceptual challenge: investment tribunals are
granted limited powers by the disputing parties to decide essentially
monetary disputes over investments; they have no jurisdiction to
deliberate criminal allegations and yet IMs to enjoin criminal
76.
77.
78.
79.

See supra Part II.G.
Id.
See supra Part II.E and D.
See supra Part II.F.
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proceedings could be viewed as venturing into this territory. But
while a tribunal’s issuance of IMs that interfere with a State’s
sovereign power to prosecute crimes may appear to overstep the
tribunal’s proper powers, they are in fact a necessary corollary of the
investor’s right to access investment arbitration as an alternative
forum to domestic courts and criminal prosecutions can be, and have
been, used to try to prejudice this right.
One of the primary rationales underlying the investment
arbitration regime is that foreign investors often fear the prospect of
being at the mercy of potentially biased domestic courts. In Host
States facing political tumult, which is a frequent contributing factor
to the violation of an investor’s rights, or in countries with a tradition
of strong governmental influence over the judiciary, this risk is
especially pronounced. This type of atmosphere is fertile breeding
ground for abuses of prosecutorial power. Now that many investors
have access to investment arbitration, the risk of being subjected to a
biased domestic court, which is at times designed solely to wreak
havoc on the arbitral process, must not be allowed simply to find
another outlet in the form of the State’s exercise of its prosecutorial
power. It would also circumvent the purpose of having BITs to begin
with as the investor would still be subject to foreign courts (and at
risk of worse outcomes), and the unchecked exercise of the State’s
prosecutorial power may aggravate the investor-State dispute and
taint the entire arbitration process, especially where evidentiary
issues are impacted. Investment tribunals’ recognition of their power
to order IMs in the criminal prosecution context is thus essential to
the integrity of investment arbitration and the protection of the
investor’s access to arbitration.
At the same time, as international investment arbitration is
coming increasingly under fire, 80 it is important that the intersection
with domestic criminal law should not become additional fuel to the
flame.
Investment tribunals are, as the discussion above
demonstrates, careful to note their respect for the Host State’s
prosecutorial power, and yet about half of the tribunals granted
investors’ requests for IMs that impinge on precisely that power.
This is not to say that those IMs were improperly ordered. On the
contrary, it may be an indication that States are shifting the exercise
of their power over investors to the prosecutorial branch. Whichever
80. A number of States are considering withdrawing from ICSID and some
already have, including Bolivia and Ecuador, both of which were respondents in
successful requests for IMs to enjoin criminal proceedings. See supra Part II.D, B,
and I.
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the case may be, given the proliferation of investment arbitrations we
can expect to see many more requests for IMs to enjoin criminal
prosecutions in the future and tribunals must be on guard to discern
which requests are legitimate and which requests constitute attempts
by investors to use investment arbitration to escape answering
legitimate criminal allegations.

